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ONE interesting, but rarely noted, electoral outcome of November 8, 2016 was that Maine became the first state in the United States of America to 
reject first-past-the-post voting (hereafter “plurality rule”) and adopt preferential 
voting instead. Should states and countries follow Maine’s lead? In the wake 
of 2016, many have argued that preferential voting produces different, better 
outcomes in terms of their consequences with respect to candidates (that is, it 
has better effects with respect to who runs, and who wins). These arguments 
turn out to be far more complex and contentious than their proponents seem 
to recognize. Which should prompt us to ask whether there is a simpler, more 
ecumenical case against plurality rule.
That is what I aim to provide in this article. The key will be to shift our focus 
away from questions about electoral consequences with respect to candidates 
and towards fraught electoral choices for voters. These choices mostly arise in 
contexts where A and B are the only candidates who have a chance of winning, 
but C is the only candidate whom it is morally conscionable to endorse: A is 
a greater evil, B is a lesser evil, and C is a principled but unpopular candidate. 
Under plurality rule, the only way for voters to decrease the odds that A wins is 
to endorse B, and thereby endorse a lesser evil. There are two compatible bases 
for thinking that an electoral system should not generate such fraught choices 
for voters. One rests on thinking that there are two types of moral norms (for 
example, consequentialist and expressive norms) that conflict in such cases, 
generating actual voting dilemmas. Another is that to many voters there seem to 
be two types of norms that conflict in such cases, generating apparent dilemmas. 
Such apparent dilemmas are still morally problematic, primarily because they 
lead to prolific political miscommunication: since votes are (treated as) expressive 
acts, ballots cast for B will be (mis)interpreted as endorsements of B.
There is an important broader lesson from this discussion. When we evaluate 
voting decisions, many think we should focus on much more than how they affect 
electoral results. The central point of this article is that the same holds when we 
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evaluate voting systems. We should care about the expressive power they give 
voters, and how this affects voters’ choices.
The roadmap is as follows. In Section I, I briefly explain plurality rule and 
alternatives like preferential voting. In Section II, I outline recent consequentialist 
arguments against plurality rule from Edward Foley, Eric Maskin, and Amartya 
Sen, and explain why they are more complex and contentious than they appear. 
In Section III, I offer two ways to develop an expressive case against plurality 
rule. I conclude in Section IV, sketching three further electoral reforms that are 
preferable in order to give voters more expressive power.
I. VOTING SYSTEMS
Plurality rule will be familiar to many, since it is used in large democracies like 
the USA and the Uk. But preferential voting is nothing new. It was devised in 
1870, and first used in a governmental election 13 years later in the Colony 
of Queensland, Australia. Various forms of preferential voting are now used 
in federal elections in several countries including Australia, the Republic of 
Ireland, Papua New Guinea, and India. Within the USA, it is used for public 
elections in several cities, including San Francisco and Minneapolis. The Maine 
citizen initiative was one of several recent attempts to extend preferential voting, 
the most famous of which being the referendum on the “alternative vote” in the 
Uk in 2011 (which failed, 67.9 per cent to 32.1 per cent).
What’s the difference between plurality rule and preferential voting? In the 
former, each voter casts a ballot for one candidate, and the candidate who receives 
the most votes (a majority or plurality) wins. There are many forms of the latter, 
but for the sake of simplicity I will focus on the most common: instant runoff 
voting (IRV). In IRV, voters rank candidates. Initially, voters’ top preferences are 
counted. If a candidate secures more than half of those, she wins. If not, the 
candidate in last place (that is, the candidate with the fewest first-preference 
votes) is eliminated. Then the top remaining preferences on all ballots are counted. 
This process repeats until a candidate has a majority of voters’ top remaining 
preferences.1
1IRV is the Single Transferable Vote (STV) method applied to a single-winner election. (Some cases 
described below, such as Australian Senate elections, technically involve STV). STV introduces some 
further complications. Here’s how it is formally explained by Riker: “For districts with S seats and m 
candidates (M ≥ S), the voters, V in number, mark ballots for first choice, second choice … and mth 
choice. A quota, q, is calculated thus: q = (V/S + 1) + 1 and q is rounded down to the largest integer 
contained in it. If a candidate receives at least q first-place votes, he or she wins, and any surplus votes 
(i.e., the number of first-place votes in excess of q) are transferred to non-winning candidates in pro-
portion to the appearance of those candidates in next place on all ballots for the initial winner. 
Another candidate who then has q first-place and reassigned votes wins, and his or her surplus is 
transferred to the next nonwinning candidate on his or her supporters’ ballots (again in proportion 
to their appearance in next place) and so on until all seats are filled. If at any point in the process 
(including the beginning) no candidate has q first-place and reassigned votes, the candidate with the 
fewest first-place and reassigned votes is eliminated and all ballots for him or her are transferred to 
candidates in the second (or next) place on those ballots; and this is repeated until some candidate has 
q votes”; W. H. Riker, Liberalism against Populism (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1988), p. 49.
 EXPRESSIVE CASE AGAINST PLURALITY RULE 365
To illustrate the difference between plurality rule and IRV, consider two 
examples. First, the 1918 Swan by-election in Australia, conducted under 
plurality rule. The Labor candidate, Edwin Corboy, was not expected to win; 
but two anti-Labor parties (the Nationalist candidate William Hedges and the 
Country candidate Basil Murray) split the vote. Corboy won with a plurality of 
34.4 per cent of the vote, compared to Hedges’ 29.6 per cent and Murray’s 31.4 
per cent. This prompted Australia to adopt IRV.
Second, the 1990 Irish presidential election, conducted under IRV, between Mary 
Robinson (Labour), Brian Lenihan (Fianna Fail), and Austin Currie (Fine Gael). 
Lenihan had a plurality of voters’ first preferences: 43.8 per cent to Robinson’s 
38.9 per cent and Currie’s 16.9 per cent. At this point, Currie was eliminated. 
Votes for Currie were distributed according to their second preferences, three-
quarters of which favored Robinson, who won with 51.9 per cent.
II. WHO WINS, AND WHO RUNS?
Given such examples, it is natural to think that if the US and Uk abandoned 
plurality rule and adopted IRV instead this would have different, better 
consequences with respect to candidates: it would have better results in terms of 
who wins and who runs. The case against plurality rule typically has this 
consequentialist form.2 A recent, illustrative example of this case comes from 
Edward Foley, who argues that the US electoral system is “defective,” insofar as 
third-party candidates “cannot enter the race without the risk of becoming a 
spoiler,” handing the election to their ideological opponents; to correct these 
defects, the US should adopt a form of preferential voting like IRV.3
Foley’s first argument focuses on which candidates win elections. “Of the fifty-
three presidential elections held since the restructuring of the Electoral College 
rules in the Twelfth Amendment,” Foley contends, “arguably a half-dozen or so 
have been ones in which the lack of a runoff mechanism affected which of the top 
two candidates won. This can be seen as a failure rate of over 10 percent”.4 
Moreover, Foley argues that these “failures” were especially consequential in 
1844, 1912, and 2000, “three elections in which the outcome was indisputably 
2I use “consequentialist” broadly to mean, roughly, outcome-based. In this context, for a conse-
quentialist—unlike for the traditional utilitarian—what makes electoral outcomes more or less valu-
able are plausibly democratic (rather than welfarist) concerns. Still, nothing hangs on the term. I 
thank an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
3Edward Foley, “Third party and independent presidential candidates: the need for a runoff mech-
anism,” Fordham Law Review, 85 (2016), 993–2010. Foley proposes that the US adopt IRV, or what 
is called “runoff voting” (as in French presidential elections).
4Foley, “Third party and independent presidential candidates,” p. 1007. Foley continues: “In light 
of this historical record, the American electorate deserves a system that puts a candidate in the Oval 
Office whom a majority of voters want there and thus, conversely, keeps out of the Oval Office a 
candidate whom the majority of voters oppose” (p. 1007), and later clarifies that on his view, “[n]o 
one should win the presidency when opposed by a majority of the electorate” (p. 1010). Foley’s 
historical analysis is largely drawn from William Poundstone’s Gaming the Vote: Why Elections 
Aren’t Fair (and What We Can Do About It (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), ch. 3.
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determined by the presence of a third candidate on the ballot,” and which “were 
three of the most history-shaping elections in the entirety of the republic’s 
existence.”5
Foley’s second argument focuses on which candidates run in elections. He 
claims that “fringe” and “mainstream” candidates opt not to enter elections for 
fear of spoiling the result: Michael Bloomberg, for instance, decided not to enter 
the 2016 US presidential election for this reason, but would have been a “middle-
of-the-road alternative without the negative baggage that weighed down both 
Trump and Clinton.”6 Foley’s claim is not “that Bloomberg would have been a 
preferable alternative to the two major-party nominees,” but that “the existing 
system is deficient” insofar as it “deprives the American electorate of an option it 
should have.”7
Others condemn plurality rule on similar grounds. Nobel laureates Eric 
Maskin and Amartya Sen argued in the New York Review of Books that the US 
electoral system “fails to reflect voters’ preferences adequately” because it allows 
third-party candidates to split the vote, so we should “choose the winner in the 
general election according to the preferences of a majority of voters rather than a 
mere plurality.”8 They argue that under a system like IRV, different candidates 
would have won the US presidential elections in 1992, 2000, and 2016. And, like 
Foley, Maskin and Sen also argue that different candidates would run in these 
elections too: plurality rule “gives citizens too few political options,” insofar as it 
gives many politicians—like “Michael Bloomberg and Bernie Sanders”—a 
“powerful disincentive to run as independent candidates.”9
These arguments are recent instances of a common and long-standing concern 
that plurality rule delivers bad results due to vote-splitting.10 And the concern 
seems straightforward. But appearances can be misleading.
Consider first the claim that electoral outcomes would have been different 
under IRV. Such claims (like Maskin and Sen’s claims about the 1992 and 2016 
elections) are not always well supported by data.11 But they also have a more 
5Foley, “Third party and independent presidential candidates,” p. 1007.
6Ibid., p. 995.
7Ibid., p. 996.
8See Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen, “The rules of the game: a new electoral system,” New York 
Review of Books, 64 (Jan. 19, 2017); and Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen, “A better way to choose 
presidents,” New York Review of Books, 64 (June 8, 2017). Maskin and Sen prefer Condorcet voting 
(more on this below), and consider IRV to be a next-best alternative: “a somewhat similar ranking 
system” that “doesn’t avoid vote splitting as successfully as majority rule but is far better on that score 
than plurality rule.”
9Maskin and Sen, “A better way to choose presidents.”
10The opening lines of Robert Weber’s “Approval voting,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
9 (1995), 39-49, quote Jean-Charles de Borda making similar points in 1770.
11On 1992, see Dean Lacy and Barry C. Burden, “The vote-stealing and turnout effects of Ross 
Perot in the 1992 U.S. presidential election,” American Journal of Political Science, 43 (1999), 233–55. 
On the 2016 primaries, see the state-wide head-to-head polls conducted by Public Policy Polling in 
New Hampshire, South Carolina, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, New York, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, and Pennsylvania; <http://www.publi cpoli cypol ling.com/main/2016-archi ve.html>. On 
the 2016 presidential election, see Edward Foley, “The electoral fix we really need,” Medium  
(Jan. 13, 2017).
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interesting problem. They rely on  holding voters’ preferences fixed when 
evaluating counterfactuals: “If the voters had those preferences but voted under 
IRV, so-and-so would have won.” The problem is that voting systems systematically 
change voters’ preferences by changing incentive structures. This includes voters’ 
incentives; tactical voting still plays a role in IRV.12 And it includes parties’ 
incentives. There is evidence that, under plurality rule, major parties (for example, 
Republicans) fund minor parties who do not share their ideology (for example, 
Greens).13 The natural explanation for why they engage in such behavior is that 
they are cynically seeking to cut into the support base for their major-party 
opponents (for example, Democrats). Many have also suggested that preferential 
voting systems incentivize more positive campaigning.14 Many voters would have 
different preferences at the end of a campaign if parties were funded differently 
and campaigned differently. So changing complex incentive structures will change 
voters’ preferences in myriad ways, making it hard to predict how electoral 
outcomes would differ.
Some might dispute this. Social scientists build complex explanatory and 
predictive models that can guide our evaluations of such counterfactuals. But 
insofar as experts’ confident predictions of actual voting behavior have been 
unreliable in recent elections in the Uk and US, we should be wary of confident 
predictions of counterfactual voting behavior under IRV.15
That’s my first concern about the consequentialist case. The second is more 
significant. Say IRV would result in predictably different outcomes from plurality 
rule. Would those outcomes be better? To bring this issue into focus, consider an 
example of a surprising electoral result under IRV.
In 2013, the state of Victoria, Australia, elected a Senator named Ricky Muir. 
Only 0.51 per cent of voters put Muir, of the Australian Motoring Enthusiasts 
Party, as their first preference. Other candidates did not have a sufficient number of 
12See Allan Gibbard, “Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result,” Econometrica, 41 
(1973), 587–601; and Mark Allen Satterthwaite, “Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: exis-
tence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions,” Journal of 
Economic Theory, 10 (1975), 187–217.
13Neil Sinababhu discusses how “hard-nosed tacticians” in major parties “coordinate funding 
schemes” to prop up minor parties they ideologically oppose, citing this example: “The $66,000 
donated to Pennsylvania Green Party Senate candidate Carl Romanelli came entirely from Republican 
sources, except for $30 from the candidate himself. $40,000 came from identifiable supporters of 
Romanelli’s Republican opponent Rick Santorum, or from their housemates. Romanelli received 
99.95% of his funding from Republicans who hoped that he would cut into the Democratic share of 
the vote”; Neil Sinababhu, “In defense of partisanship,” E. Crookston, D. killoren, and J. Trerise (eds), 
Ethics in Politics: The Rights and Obligations of Individual Political Agents (New York: Routledge, 
2017), pp. 75–90. Democrats have also funded Republican spoilers: see Poundstone, Gaming the 
Vote, ch. 6.
14See Ben Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 89 (on Papua New Guinea). For supporting evi-
dence from elections in US cities, see Todd Donovan, Caroline Tolbert, and kellen Gracey, “Campaign 
civility under preferential and plurality voting,” Electoral Studies, 42 (2016), 157–63.
15More can be said against relying on such predictions. For instance, in making such predictions, 
many social scientists continue to employ median voter theorem, a theorem which Geoff Brennan and 
Loren Lomasky argue is “fundamentally misconceived”; Democracy and Decision (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 77.
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voters’ first preferences, and voters’ nth preferences were distributed haphazardly 
over many unknown, unserious candidates. As other candidates were progressively 
eliminated, Muir won a seat. Plausibly, he would not have won under plurality rule. 
Indeed, Muir would have been far less likely to even run under plurality rule. So 
would plurality rule’s consequences with respect to candidates have been worse?
I doubt it. Perhaps plurality rule often provides voters with too little choice; it 
produces elections dominated by two major-party candidates. But IRV often 
provides voters with too much choice. When Senate races include several dozen 
candidates, the difficulty of producing a conscientious ranking becomes staggering. 
This should amplify common concerns about the ill effects of voter ignorance.16 
How do we balance these good and bad consequences against each other?
Similarly, when Maskin and Sen write that plurality rule “fails to reflect voters’ 
preferences adequately,” we must ask: which preferences? Is it more democratic 
to count voters’ first and nth preferences equally? Maskin and Sen might respond 
that they prefer a more complex system than IRV. Specifically, they prefer a 
Condorcet system in which voters make pairwise comparisons between all 
candidates. It is not clear that this is feasible; consider the number of pairwise 
comparisons Victoria’s voters would have had to make in 2013.17 But, more 
importantly, it doesn’t address the underlying problem, as Foley recognizes: “It is 
possible that a Condorcet winner could be an extremely weak candidate, the very 
lukewarm second choice of many voters.”18 Foley considers how such a scenario 
could have arisen with Gary Johnson: “Trump supporters would prefer Johnson 
to Clinton, and Clinton supporters would prefer Johnson to Trump, but perhaps 
neither Trump nor Clinton supporters are enthusiastic at all about Johnson.”19 
According to Foley, “it would be better to require the electorate to make a decisive 
choice between the two front-runners … rather than let Johnson win the White 
House [as] the first-choice candidate of fewer than 10 percent of the voters.”20 I 
agree. But, as Muir’s victory demonstrates, that same problem occurs under IRV.21
16These concerns aren’t speculative. Empirical evidence supports the conjecture that increasing the 
number of items on the agenda makes it harder for people to vote as they would have done had they 
been fully informed. See R. P. Lau, P. Patel, D. F. Fahmy, and R. P. kaufman, “Correct voting across 
thirty-three democracies: a preliminary analysis,” British Journal of Political Science, 44 (2014), 
239–59. Moreover, evidence from recent elections in US cities and counties suggests that many voters 
had too little information to rank more than a few of the candidates, resulting in a tenth to a quarter 
of ballots being “exhausted.” Each of these four elections only allowed voters to rank their top three 
candidates. But 18% of ballots were also exhausted in Portland’s 2011 mayoral election, where voters 
could rank as many of the 15 eligible candidates as they wanted. See Craig Burnett and Vladimir 
kogan, “Ballot (and voter) ‘exhaustion’ under instant runoff voting: an examination of four ranked-
choice elections,” Electoral Studies, 37 (2015), 41–9.
17That election involved 34 groups of candidates. The problem of computational infeasibility was 
known to Condorcet himself, and also affects some alternative voting systems; see Robert E. Goodin, 
Reflective Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 93, n. 12 and references therein.
18Foley, “Third party and independent presidential candidates,” p. 128.
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21Of course, candidates with lukewarm support can win elections under plurality rule. Worse yet, 
under plurality rule, the ballots cast will not reveal whether this is so; see Section III.C.
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Muir’s victory is not an anomaly in Australia. In 1987 the Nuclear Disarmament 
Party’s Robert Wood was elected to the New South Wales Senate, despite receiving 
1.5 per cent of voters’ first preferences. There are other recent cases of Australian 
Senators who have been elected with a tiny share of first preferences: Steve 
Fielding (2004), John Madigan (2010), David Leyonhjelm (2013). Granted, in 
all of these examples, features of Australian Senate elections other than IRV also 
played a role. (The same applies to perverse outcomes in US presidential examples, 
which involve plurality rule and the infamous Electoral College). Despite this, the 
underlying concern illustrated by Muir’s case is worth heeding.
One reason why is that Muir-like cases could occur in many other systems 
with IRV. For instance, consider the 2003 California gubernatorial recall election. 
Arnold Schwarzenegger (R) won with 48.6 per cent of the vote (under plurality 
rule), beating incumbent Cruz Bustamente (D). However, over 100 “protest 
candidates” also ran in the election, many with frivolous campaigns. Imagine 
that voters split into the following three clusters:
48.6% Rep (Schwarzenegger > Bustamente > protest candidates)
25.4% Dem (Bustamente > protest candidates > Schwarzenegger)
26% Protest (protest candidates > Bustamente > Schwarzenegger)
That is, the set of protest candidates were (in whatever order) ranked at 
the bottom by close to half the electorate, in the middle by roughly a quarter, 
and above the major party candidates by roughly a quarter. Under IRV, one 
of 100-odd protest candidates would be eliminated first, and another second, 
and another third, and so on. Eventually, however, one protest candidate 
would emerge with 26 per cent of voters’ top remaining preferences, edging 
out Bustamente. Bustamente’s voters ranked all of the protest candidates above 
Schwarzenegger, so a protest candidate would now have a majority (51.4 per 
cent) of the top remaining preferences, and win the election. It doesn’t matter 
who the winning candidate would be in this fictionalized example. A Ricky 
Muir-type could have won with a tiny fraction of first preferences.
Another reason to take Ricky Muir’s case seriously is that it simply points to 
how plurality rule can result in outcomes that are plausibly “perverse.” This is a 
conclusion that many have defended, in a variety of ways.22
22Riker argues for this at length in Liberalism against Populism, chs 4–6. For a response to Riker, 
see Gerry Mackie, Democracy Defended (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), e.g. at p. 
55. A common concern about IRV is that it allows for violations of monotonicity; see Gideon Doron 
and Richard kronick, “Single transferable vote: an example of a perverse social choice function,” 
American Journal of Political Science, 21 (1977), 303–11; and for discussion based on empirical ex-
amples from US mayoral elections, see Joseph T. Ornstein and Robert Z. Norman, “Frequency of 
monotonicity failure under instant runoff voting: estimates based on a spatial model of elections,” 
Public Choice, 161 (2014), 1–9.
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In short, the consequentialist case against plurality rule seems straightforward, 
but ultimately relies on complex empirical questions about how electoral systems 
would produce different results, and contentious ethical questions about why 
different results would be better. More can be said about these issues; I do not claim 
they are irresolvable, or that these consequentialist concerns about plurality rule 
are unfounded. One could bolster the consequentialist case by arguing that plurality 
rule produces worse electoral outcomes due to certain formal results in social 
choice theory. But again, this proves contentious. For one thing, while the formal 
features of plurality rule involve distinct vices compared to alternative electoral 
systems, they also involve at least two distinct virtues.23 For another, in comparing 
the virtues and vices of different electoral systems we need to consider not only 
formal results about whether certain perverse outcomes are possible, but complex 
empirical questions about whether those outcomes are more or less probable.24
III. VOTING DILEMMAS
Is there a simpler, more ecumenical case against plurality rule? I believe so. It 
begins by shifting our focus from questions about candidates (who wins and 
who runs), and towards fraught electoral choices for voters. The basis for this 
was briefly suggested by Geoff Brennan and Loren Lomasky in their discussion 
of the expressive ethics of individual voting decisions. Regarding contexts in 
which minor parties split the vote, they wrote:
The dilemma for the supporter of the minor party is, of course, due to the nature 
of the voting procedure being used. A person can avail herself of only one expressive 
act, but that is not enough to both pronounce on the relative merits of the 
Republican and Democrat and to indicate her overall preference. There is, then, an 
alternative to criticizing or exonerating the minor-party voter: It is to fault the 
voting system for presenting the dilemma in the first place. Requiring voters to 
select only one candidate when several are running is a procedure too [coarse-
grained] to provide adequate opportunity for individuals to express all the 
significant preferences they hold. Some form of preferential voting would obviate 
much of the thrown-away-vote malaise.25
My aim will be to explore two complementary and compatible ways of developing 
this expressive case against plurality rule and for systems like IRV. On the first, 
plurality rule generates actual voting dilemmas; on the second, plurality rule 
generates apparent voting dilemmas.
23Each of these distinct virtues is somewhat complex and technical, so I will not summarize either 
here: on the first, see Christian List and Robert E. Goodin, “Epistemic democracy: generalizing the 
Condorcet jury theorem,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 9 (2001), 277–306; on the second, see 
Robert E. Goodin and Christian List, “A conditional defense of plurality rule: generalizing May’s 
theorem in a restricted informational environment,” American Journal of Political Science, 50 (2006), 
940–9.
24Mackie makes this point well in Democracy Defended, passim, and especially at p. 87.
25Brennan and Lomasky, Democracy and Decision, pp. 193–4. (I replaced “ingrained”).
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A. Actual Voting Dilemmas
Presented schematically, the first way to develop the case is as follows:
P1. Different types of norms are relevant to the ethics of voting.
P2. Plurality rule generates conflicts between these norms.
P3. If plurality rule generates conflicts between these norms, voters actually face 
dilemmas under plurality rule.
C1. So, voters actually face dilemmas under plurality rule.
P4. If voters actually face dilemmas under plurality rule, we should prefer 
alternatives to plurality rule like IRV.
C2.: So, we should prefer alternatives to plurality rule like IRV.
Let’s work through this step by step. Why think that P1 is true? I take it that 
this is a commonsensical position about the ethics of voting. On this position, 
there are familiar consequentialist concerns about how our votes help bring 
about good or bad electoral outcomes. And, as Lomasky and Brennan have 
argued, it is very plausible that in the ethics of voting, “to a considerable extent 
independent of … consequential considerations there exist norms of 
expression.”26 As they illustrate that point:
To cast a klan ballot is to identify oneself in a morally significant way with the 
racist policies that the organization espouses. One thereby lays oneself open to 
associated moral liability whether the candidate has a small, large, or zero 
probability of gaining victory, and whether or not one’s own vote has an appreciable 
likelihood of affecting the election result.27
Of course, this commonsensical position could be false. But for now I will defer 
objections in order to get the rest of the argument on the table.
Now turn to P2. If distinct norms are relevant to the ethics of voting, in principle 
they could conflict and thereby generate actual dilemmas. Indeed, in practice, 
plurality rule generates such conflicts pervasively. A toy example illustrates how. 
Imagine that you are a black student in a recently desegregated 100-student high 
school which is voting for its class president. Three candidates enter the race. Eric 
the extreme racist supports re-segregation, teaching “both sides” of the Civil War 
debate over slavery, and even more odious positions. Morris is a more moderate 
racist: he accepts desegregation, but wants other policies that stigmatize blacks. 
26Loren Lomasky and Geoffrey Brennan, “Is there a duty to vote?,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 
17 (2000), 62–86, at p. 80.
27Brennan and Lomasky, Democracy and Decision, p. 186.
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Bayard, the only black candidate, stands on an anti-racist platform; he is sure to 
lose—the school is 80 per cent white and quite racist—but runs anyway.
Imagine further that support for these candidates breaks down as follows:
Eric Morris Bayard
45 33 22
Consider how you should vote. You know that it is exceedingly unlikely that 
most of Morris’s supporters will vote for Bayard, so there is no chance that he 
will win. You could vote for Bayard, thereby making it more likely that Eric, an 
extreme racist, will triumph. Or you could vote for Morris, thereby identifying 
with and endorsing a racist candidate and platform. Consequentialist and 
expressive norms strongly militate in favor of incompatible actions here. In that 
sense, they conflict in this case. This is a problem with the choice voters faced.
Now turn to P3. If there is a conflict between these norms, why think that 
Bayard’s supporters face a dilemma in the hypothetical? And if they do, why 
think that actual voters face similar dilemmas under plurality rule?
I take it that there is an intuitive sense in which Bayard’s supporters face a 
dilemma. This need not mean that their options are all impermissible: it may be 
permissible to vote for Bayard to avoid identifying with racism, and permissible to 
vote for Morris to avoid allowing an extreme racist to win. Minimally, the dilemma 
may consist in the fact that, whatever they do, Bayard’s supporters expose 
themselves to a legitimate, unanswered complaint; each action has a “moral 
residue.” More strongly, the dilemma might consist of each choice involving 
sacrificing something of significant value where these values are incomparable, 
such that voters cannot make rational trade-offs between consequentialist and 
expressive norms. The lattermost view is the one I have in mind,28 though the case 
developed here could proceed on stronger or weaker accounts of dilemmas.
Will actual voters face similar dilemmas under plurality rule? I believe so. It is 
a common complaint of many voters under plurality rule that they face fraught 
choices between “wasting” their votes on an unelectable candidate or endorsing 
a lesser evil. We could speculate ad nauseam about why that might be. It could 
be to do with the careerist advantages viciousness affords; the ladder is easier 
to climb if one is not weighed down by a conscience. It could be to do with the 
electoral advantages that viciousness affords; if most voters have preferences like 
Eric’s and Morris’s, candidates like Bayard who come to the fore will rarely make 
it over the line. Whatever the reason, it is plausible that voters will and do face 
actual dilemmas under plurality rule, just like the one Bayard’s supporters face.
Now turn to P4. If voters face actual dilemmas under plurality rule, should 
we prefer alternatives like IRV? Consider a decision Bayard’s supporters could 
28I take it that this view is closest to how “dilemma” is used by Brennan and Lomasky, as it relates 
to the quote at the start of Section III: voting dilemmas are understood as conflicts between instru-
mental and expressive/intrinsic preferences, which they argue are incommensurable; Democracy and 
Decision, pp. 50–1, 147ff.
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make under IRV: they could vote for Bayard first and Morris second, and avoid 
endorsing a racist without thereby increasing the odds that an extreme racist will 
win. So under IRV, no dilemma arises. Voters can rank candidates in a way that is 
at least acceptable according to both consequentialist and expressive norms. And 
what goes for our toy case goes for voting more generally. That’s how systems 
like IRV “obviate much of the thrown-away-vote malaise”: they allow voters to 
help prevent a greater evil without requiring them to endorse a lesser evil.
Why is this better? It is a plausible principle that, ceteris paribus, it is unfair to 
force others to face such dilemmas (however they are understood). Ceteris 
paribus, we should not force others to either break a promise or cause harm, or 
to deceive others or disclose private or confidential information. It may be that 
forcing others to face such dilemmas is sometimes unavoidable; it may also be 
that some isolated cases where someone is forced to face such a dilemma are 
innocuous.29 But plurality rule actually violates the principle that we should not 
force others to face dilemmas pervasively, and in a way that is avoidable under 
alternative systems like IRV. This gives us pro tanto reasons to prefer such 
alternatives.
B. Objections
That completes the first argument: plurality rule gives rise to actual voting 
dilemmas, so we should prefer alternatives like IRV. Now we can turn to the 
myriad objections. I will not try to show that each objection is obviously baseless. 
My aim is to show that the case is plausible, not that it is uncontestable. I will 
also remind the reader that if they are persuaded that the argument from actual 
voting dilemmas fails, plurality rule may still be problematic on the ground 
that it generates apparent voting dilemmas (see Section III.C; some readers may 
prefer to skip to that section).
For the sake of clarity, I will discuss objections to P1 and P2 together. Are these 
premises plausible when we shift our attention from high school elections to 
political elections, which are larger by orders of magnitude? In such cases, would 
plurality rule still generate conflicts between different types of moral norms, 
some which militate in favor of voting for Morris-like candidates, while others 
militate in favor of voting for Bayard-like candidates?
Let’s start with whether there are moral norms that favor voting for lesser-evil 
candidates in large-scale political elections. One could deny this by arguing that 
29As an anonymous referee points out, if we are moral pluralists (à la W. D. Ross, The Right and 
the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), dilemmas between incommensurable principles 
or values may “be a pervasive feature of our experience.” This may well be true, but it doesn’t follow 
that the avoidance of such dilemmas is not “a particularly weighty consideration” in favor of electoral 
systems like IRV. A set of moral dilemmas, each of which arises due to miscellaneous causes, should 
be treated differently from a set of dilemmas, all of which arise from a common cause, like plurality 
rule. For discussion of a related concern about the dilemmas that are generated by gender-specific 
pronouns, see Robin Dembroff and Daniel Wodak, “He/she/they/ze,” Ergo, 5 (2018).
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consequentialist norms become irrelevant in such elections, for two reasons. First, 
as we shift to large-scale elections like the 2016 US presidential election, the odds 
that you will cast a vote that makes a difference to the result—that your vote is 
what defeats a greater evil—are far too low. (Exactly how low those odds are is 
a matter of some debate; the range in estimates for recent US presidential elections 
is considerable).30 This point may not be sufficient to make consequentialist 
norms irrelevant to political elections. The odds of your vote making a difference 
in, for example, state-wide political elections can be high enough. In Virginia’s 
94th District in 2017, Shelly Simonds (D) and David Yancey (R) each received 
11,608 votes; one more vote for Simonds would have decided the election in her 
favor, and thereby prevented the Republican party from having a one-seat 
majority in the VA House of Delegates. Moreover, while the odds of making a 
difference are lower in presidential elections, the stakes are likely to be much 
higher, and arguably when “the stakes are very high, no chance, however small, 
should be ignored.”31
Second, it is sometimes argued that the stakes in large-scale elections will 
rarely, if ever, be sufficiently high. Electoral competition is likely to produce 
parties and candidates in near proximity to each other, as they all vie for the votes 
of median voters. And where there are significant differences between parties and 
candidates, either you should think that your assessment of their relative merits 
is highly fallible (because the relevant evidence is esoteric) or you should think 
that the relative difference in their merits is common knowledge (because the 
relevant evidence is readily available). In the former case, the expected value of 
your vote is low, because it is discounted by your fallibility; in the latter, it is low, 
because it is so likely that the better candidate will win in a landslide, without 
your vote. Or at least, so Lomasky and Brennan argued in an influential article in 
2000.32
Perhaps their reasoning still holds for many political elections. But I have some 
doubts. For one, the hyper-partisan fervor that characterizes contemporary 
politics has resulted in increased political polarization. Measures of the ideological 
distance between major-party candidates and representatives in the US reached 
new peaks in 2016.33 For another, we must take into account the fragmentation 
and polarization of media consumption patterns. Plausibly, many citizens can be 
justifiably confident that candidate A is significantly better than B on the basis of 
readily available, non-esoteric evidence, without thereby becoming confident that 
A will beat B by a huge margin. Why? Because they know that many other citizens 
30According to Jason Brennan, the odds of that in 2004 were approximately 1 in 10 to the power 
of -2650; The Ethics of Voting (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 19; Andrew Gelman, 
Nate Silver, and Aaron Edlin estimate the odds in 2012 as being as high as 1 in 10 million, at least for 
voters in several critical swing states; “What is the probability your vote will make a difference?,” 
Economic Inquiry, 50 (2012), 321–6, at p. 325.
31Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 74–5.
32See Lomasky and Brennan, “Is there a duty to vote?,” pp. 67–74.
33See Lee Drutman, “American politics has reached peak polarization,” Vox, Mar. 16, 2016, 
<https ://www.vox.com/polya rchy/2016/3/24/11298 808/ameri can-polit ics-peak-polar ization>.
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remain in echo chambers that amplify misinformation and insulate them from 
important, readily available sources of evidence.34 And even if one justifiably 
believes that A should beat B by a large margin, polling data can provide strong 
independent evidence that the race will be tight.35 Such factors support the 
relevance of consequentialist norms in modern large-scale political elections: the 
stakes can be sufficiently high, without thereby making the odds of your making 
a difference too low.
There remains a distinct challenge here, however. If consequentialist norms are 
relevant in large-scale elections, do they militate in favor of voting for lesser-evil 
candidates? Paul Meehl famously argued that consequentialist norms militate in 
favor of voting for minor-party, Bayard-like candidates.36 His reasoning was 
relatively simple. The odds of your vote making the Morris-like or the Bayard-like 
candidate win are similarly low, but the stakes of a Bayard-like candidate winning 
are much higher, so consequentialist norms militate in favor of voting for the latter.
I doubt that this always pans out. Given the myriad ways in which stakes and 
odds in elections can be arranged, consequentialist norms can sometimes demand 
that we vote for lesser-evil candidates.37 But since there’s much more to be said 
about these objections, it’s worth considering a different way of supporting the 
claim that there are moral norms that militate in favor of voting for Morris-like 
candidates in political elections. Perhaps we should consider “causal” rather than 
consequentialist norms, since proponents of causal norms aim to capture concerns 
about voters causing good electoral outcomes, while accepting that each voter’s 
decision has a minuscule probability of making a difference to those outcomes. 
On causal views, the ethics of voting turns on voters’ exercising agency and 
acquiring causal responsibility for certain electoral outcomes by being among a 
sufficient set of voters who jointly brought about that outcome.38
In political elections, would causal norms militate in favor of voting for 
Morris-like candidates in order to defeat Eric-like candidates? The answer is not 
34For discussion of such issues and relevant empirical research on partisan media consumption, 
see my “Fake news and echo chambers,” MS.
35I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pushing me on these issues, and to Brian Hedden for 
suggesting the point about polling here (in personal communication).
36Paul Meehl (in the voice of the Flat Earth Vegetarian advocate in his dialogue) makes this point 
in “The selfish voter paradox and the thrown-away vote argument,” American Political Science 
Review, 71 (1977), 11–30.
37Brennan and Lomasky suggest a consequentialist response to Meehl: that “even though the 
probability of decisiveness if one votes for a major party candidate is small, it is many times greater, 
indeed infinitely greater, than if one votes for [the minor party candidate]”; Democracy and Decision, 
p. 192. This response may suffice for my purposes, even though it does not undermine Meehl’s origi-
nal point: that a vote for either major-party candidate is not reputable in a way that a vote for a mi-
nor-party candidate is not.
38On Alvin Goldman’s view, one must be among any minimally sufficient set of voters for the 
outcome; “Why citizens should vote: a causal responsibility approach,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 
16 (1999), 201–17. On Richard Tuck’s view, one must be among the actual minimally sufficient set of 
voters for the outcome; Free Riding (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), ch. 2. For 
helpful discussion of both views, see Geoffrey Brennan and Geoff Sayre-McCord, “Voting and causal 
responsibility,” D. Sobel, D. Vallentyne, and S. Wall (eds), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, vol. 
1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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immediately obvious. This is partly because proponents of causal norms typically 
focus on voters’ responsibility for securing desired outcomes, rather than voters’ 
responsibility for preventing undesired outcomes. And it is partly because 
proponents of causal views typically focus on two-party elections.39 But I think 
that there’s a good case that the answer is “Yes.”
Consider the undesired outcome: the victory of an Eric-like candidate. We are 
assuming that what will secure this outcome is the victory of the Morris-like 
candidate. According to causal views, only voters who contribute to Morris’s 
electoral margin are causally responsible for his victory and Eric’s loss. Unless 
one votes for the candidate who actually beats Eric, one’s vote is not causally 
responsible for Eric’s defeat. As Brennan and Sayre-McCord have argued, 
according to causal views, “Voting for a losing candidate deprives you of anything 
to be responsible for. So if you want to be causally responsible for an event in 
political history … you need to vote for the winner.”40 One may object here that 
voters don’t know that Bayard-like candidates will lose. But on causal views, they 
don’t need to know this. For instance, Tuck argues that on his account one has “a 
good reason to vote” for a candidate when one believes that “there are likely to 
be enough votes for [that] candidate for [one’s] vote to be part of a causally 
efficacious set.”41 There can be many actual large-scale elections where voters can 
only reasonably believe that this holds for evil and lesser-evil candidates. So 
insofar as voters have strong moral reasons to secure the defeat of greater evils at 
the ballot box, causal views will sometimes militate in favor of voting for lesser-
evil candidates like Morris in large-scale elections.42
Let’s grant, then, that some moral norms often militate in favor of voting for 
Morris-like candidates in large-scale elections. Do countervailing norms often 
militate in favor of voting for Bayard-like candidates?
One could deny this by arguing that expressive norms are irrelevant to the 
ethics of voting.43 Prior to the 2016 presidential election, expressive concerns 
about voting were often dismissed as unimportant or, worse yet, narcissistic. For 
example, John Halle and Noam Chomsky wrote a widely shared eight-point 
guide to “lesser-evil voting,” which began:
39Consider how Goldman’s view, framed in terms of vectorial causal systems, is modeled on a tug-
of-war in which forces are exerted on a rope in two opposite directions; “Why citizens should vote,” 
p. 210.
40Brennan and Sayre-McCord, “Voting and causal responsibility,” p. 48.
41Tuck, Free Riding, p. 60.
42There are some interesting complications here, however, that may undermine this argument. For 
instance, if the relevant moral duty is just to be a vector of force against extreme racism, that might 
be satisfied by voting for losing Bayard-like candidates. Goldman states his view, a vote for “a rival 
candidate” is a negative vector vis-à-vis Eric’s possible victory. So by voting for Bayard, one is a vector 
of force against extreme racism, even though one votes for a losing candidate; Goldman, “Why citi-
zens should vote,” p. 211.
43For interesting discussion of this issue, see inter alia Brennan and Lomasky, Democracy and 
Decision, ch. 10; Jason Brennan, “Political liberty: who needs it?,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 29 
(2012), 1–27: Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); and Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999).
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1. Voting should not be viewed as a form of personal self-expression or moral 
judgement directed in retaliation towards major party candidates who fail to 
reflect our values …
2. The exclusive consequence of the act of voting in 2016 will be (if in a contested 
“swing state”) to marginally increase or decrease the chance of one of the major 
party candidates winning 44
If this is right, Bayard’s supporters face no irresolvable dilemma. The only 
relevant consideration is whether their votes increase the odds that Eric will win 
the election, which is best achieved by voting for Morris.
Such objections to expressive norms about voting are not persuasive. Halle and 
Chomsky’s objection relies on expressive norms conflicting with consequentialist 
norms. But why should that make us give up on expressive norms, rather than the 
voting system that generates such conflicts? Other objections identify expressive 
motivations to vote with frivolous, idiosyncratic motivations: in Burdick, an 
important decision about write-in candidates, the US Supreme Court held that 
“the function of the election process is to ‘winnow out and finally reject all but 
the chosen candidates’, not to provide a means of giving vent to ‘short-range 
political goals, pique, or personal quarrels’.”45 We will return to Burdick 
eventually. For now, we should simply note that Bayard’s supporters’ expressive 
concerns about endorsing a candidate like Morris are far from frivolous.
A more general point about expressive norms is worth making here. Brennan 
and Lomasky’s view is akin to general “expressive theories” that “tell actors—
whether individuals, associations, or the State—to act in ways that express 
appropriate attitudes toward various substantive values.” Unsurprisingly, then, 
common objections to their view reflect the general mistake of “think[ing] that 
expressive evaluation somehow requires us to ignore the consequences of action—
an absurd position.”46 So we should not dismiss expressive norms as frivolous or 
narcissistic.
But if one is moved by these objections to expressive norms, we could appeal 
to moral norms that concern integrity or self-respect.47 Concerns about integrity 
44John Halle and Noam Chomsky, “An eight point brief for LEV (lesser evil voting),” Chomsky.
info (June 15, 2016), <https ://choms ky.info/an-eight-point-brief-for-lev-lesser-evil-votin g/>.
45Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 445, 438 (1992), quoting Storer v. Brown 415 U.S. 724, 735 
(1974). These complaints are often echoed: see, e.g., Dennis Thompson, who writes that “The critics 
of the expressive view are right to resist the implication that voting should in general be an occasion 
for venting personal feelings or registering protests”; Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process 
in the United States (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002), p. 23. Thompson never explains why 
expressive views have that implication.
46Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, “Expressive theories of law: a general restatement,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 143 (2000), 1503–75, at pp. 1504, 1513.
47For many, the locus classicus in appeals to moral integrity is Bernard Williams, “A critique of 
utilitarianism,” B. Williams and J. J. C. Smart (eds), Utilitarianism—For and Against (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 77–150. For my purposes, the views associated with W. E. B. 
Dubois would be more relevant: see discussion in Bernard R. Boxill, “Self-respect and protest,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 58–69.
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or self-respect could recapture why it is problematic for black students to have to 
vote for Morris in order to defeat Eric. And these same concerns apply to large-
scale political elections. Voting for a moderate racist would be “a silent submission 
to civic inferiority” by black voters, who have strong reasons of self-respect to 
protest anti-black racism “even when it is clear that this will bring no respite and, 
instead, cause them further injury.”48 That is to say, moral norms of self-respect 
can militate in favor of voting for Bayard-like candidates, even when doing so 
may result in worse electoral outcomes: the victory of an extreme racist.
Much more can be said here, but this is enough, I hope, to show that P1 and 
P2 are plausible in large-scale political elections. Different types of norms are 
relevant to the ethics of voting (be they consequentialist or causal, expressive or 
integrity-based) and plurality rule generates conflicts between these norms (as 
they militate voting for and against lesser evils).
What about P3? If plurality rule generates conflicts between these norms, 
does it generate dilemmas? Perhaps not. Perhaps the complaints arising from 
expressive norms are easily answerable by pointing to one’s intention to comply 
with consequentialist norms. In other words, Bayard’s supporters who cast a 
ballot for Morris thereby expose themselves to the complaint that they have 
endorsed and identified with racism, but that complaint is answered by their 
saying: “I did not intend to endorse Morris; I just intended to defeat Eric.” This 
answer either shows that their vote never expressed endorsement of Morris or 
cancels that endorsement.
This objection is interesting because it presses on a neglected issue in the 
literature on expressive norms in relation to voting. How should we think of 
voting as an expressive act? Does what a vote for Morris communicates depend 
on voters’ intentions? And if it doesn’t depend on voters’ intentions, can it be 
canceled by voters revealing their intentions?
The key move in explaining why this objection fails will be similar to a move 
made in defending expressive theories in ethics: denying that the relevant 
“meanings are primarily identified with the speaker’s intentions.”49 Instead, we 
should accept that votes have social meanings. Many actions are thought to have 
social meanings. Punishment expresses condemnation, for instance, even when 
those imposing it do so for idiosyncratic reasons.50 It may be helpful to frame this 
in terms of J. L. Austin’s view of speech acts. Indeed, Austin thought of voting as 
48Boxill, “Self-respect and protest,” pp. 58 (quoting Dubois) and 62. Boxill endorses Dubois’s 
position that reasons of self-respect can militate in favor of futile or harmful acts.
49Anderson and Pildes, “Expressive theories of law,” p. 1572. I do not think that this move is in-
consistent with Brennan and Lomasky’s view, though it is worth noting that their focus on “expressive 
preferences” and their examples of private consumer choices suggest that what is expressed depends 
primarily upon the speaker: see Democracy and Decision at, e.g., p. 34. I take it that their view is best 
thought of as being like Robert Nozick’s: “A large part of the richness of our lives consists in symbolic 
meanings and their expression, the symbolic meanings our culture attributes to things or the ones we 
ourselves bestow”; The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 30, 
emphasis mine. Note that meanings can be determined by a culture or by an individual.
50The locus classicus for this view about punishment is Joel Feinberg, “The expressive function of 
punishment,” Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
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a speech act, and suggested that its social meaning is closely connected to 
endorsement.51 This view seems to be tacitly accepted; philosophical and legal 
writing on voting often treats it as expressing endorsement, even in contexts 
where the existence of idiosyncratic reasons to vote are salient.52
To motivate this view, consider an analogy. Someone circulates a petition 
saying “The Vice-chancellor is corrupt and should be fired”; you sign, intending 
to impress your colleagues with your bravado; the petition gains traction and the 
Vice-chancellor is fired, before a subsequent investigation exonerates her of the 
trumped-up charges. At this point, you can turn around and say “Well, I only 
intended to express my bravado.” But saying this does not entail that you never 
endorsed the view that the VC is corrupt and should be fired. Nor does it cancel 
this endorsement. What goes for petitions goes for voting; indeed, petitions and 
votes have often been viewed as fairly similar forms of political communication.53 
There is a difference, however: you may be formally entitled to retract your 
endorsement by retracting your signature from the petition, but no similar 
mechanism allows you to retract a vote in, say, a presidential election.
On an Austinian view, it is unsurprising that acts like signing a petition or 
voting for a candidate have social meanings that are not determined or canceled 
by one’s idiosyncratic intentions. Some people promise without intending to 
follow through, but it does not follow that they never express or can easily cancel 
a commitment to follow through; one cannot evade liability for one’s promises 
that easily. This holds despite the public knowledge that some people make 
promises without intending to follow through. Likewise, the public knowledge 
that some people vote for candidates they do not endorse just makes some votes 
insincere.54 When we know that insincerity is rampant we may not attribute 
endorsement of x to each voter for x (just as we may not attribute an intention to 
φ to all who promise to φ), but that doesn’t alter the social meaning of voting.55
Even if one denies that voting has a social meaning, a weaker claim may suffice 
to undermine the objection. Consider “upvoting” or “liking” on websites or 
51J. L. Austin offered “vot[ing] for” as a central example of an “exercitive” speech act. He also 
wrote that “To say ’I favour X’ may, according to context, be to vote for X, to espouse X, or to 
applaud X”; How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 154–7.
52For instance, Eric Pacuit describes strategic voters as “misrepresenting their preferences” and not 
“choos[ing] their ballots sincerely”; “Voting methods,” Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (fall 2017). Armand Derfner and Gerald Hebert note that the US Supreme Court has re-
peatedly characterized the “right to vote in terms of ‘voice’ and expression”; see their “Voting is 
speech,” Yale Law and Policy Review, 34 (2016), 471–91, at p. 485, and see references, esp. on p. 486, 
nn. 96–100.
53On their constitutional similarities, see Derfner and Hebert, “Voting is speech.”
54As I noted above, it is very common to describe strategic votes as dishonest or insincere. See 
further Poundstone, Gaming the Vote, p. 191. See also the discussion of miscommunication below. I 
thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point about public knowledge.
55As an anonymous referee notes, that the social meaning of a vote includes approval or endorse-
ment leaves open the exact content of what each voter endorses. In some cases, this content will be 
clear because it will be widely agreed that a single issue dominates the election: “The election between 
A and B is a referendum on X.” The Eric–Morris–Bayard election is framed as such a case. But I am 
not sure what to say about other cases. This issue warrants further research, but I do not think the 
case developed here hangs on it.
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social media. In some contexts, this takes place with rigorous privacy settings 
such that viewers can see the aggregate “likes” but not their origins. These 
contexts are quite like mass voting with secret ballots. And they are not immune 
to idiosyncratic intentions: you might “like” a post by the klan to show that you 
are a provocateur, but since this act is viewed in the aggregate the social meaning 
of your “like” would not be that you are a provocateur. It would be that one 
additional person identifies with and endorses an odious form of racism.56 If this 
is right, one’s idiosyncratic individual intentions cannot shape the social meaning 
of one’s vote when ballots are cast secretly and tallied collectively. In mass public 
elections like this, far too few of us have a soapbox tall enough or a megaphone 
loud enough to convey our idiosyncratic intentions in shaping or canceling the 
default interpretation of our votes. So the objection fails.57
These points about how voting expresses endorsement also help to address 
one final objection, which targets P4. One might deny that alternatives like IRV 
avoid voting dilemmas better than plurality rule. Doesn’t ranking Bayard first and 
Morris second still express some endorsement of Morris’s racism? Perhaps. But 
if it does, it expresses much weaker endorsement than casting a vote for Morris 
under plurality rule. It is better to express weaker than stronger endorsement 
of racism. So I do not think that this objection is damning. But if voting has a 
social meaning, I think there is a deeper problem with this objection. Plausibly, 
the social meaning of your ranking a candidate second depends largely on who 
you rank first. Voting for Eric first and Morris second communicates something 
different from voting for Bayard first and Morris second. The first communicates 
that Morris is not racist enough; the second that Morris is too racist. Endorsing 
and identifying with Bayard and his anti-racist platform by ranking him first 
and Morris second may still communicate not just less approval of Morris, but 
disapproval of Morris. In this way, the available orderings under IRV give each 
voter more expressive power.
C. Apparent Voting Dilemmas
The first argument against plurality rule is plausible, but it also turned out 
to be, perhaps, less simple and ecumenical than we might have hoped. So it 
is worth exploring how the expressive case against plurality rule can proceed 
from a simpler, less contentious claim about apparent dilemmas, in a way that is 
compatible with most objections canvassed above.
56The meaning of “upvotes,” “likes,” et al. has been studied. See Rebecca A. Hayes, Caleb T. Carr, 
and Donghee Yvette Wohn, “One click, many meanings: interpreting paralinguistic digital affor-
dances in social media,” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 60 (2016), 171–87, and ref-
erences therein. For discussion of these forms of engagement with political communication on social 
media, see Susan Sarapin and Pamala Morris, “When ‘like’-minded people click: Facebook interaction 
conventions, the meaning of ‘speech’ online, and Bland v. Roberts,” First Amendment Studies, 48 
(2014), 131–57, esp. p. 149. I thank an anonymous referee for pushing me on this issue.
57Or at least, it fails for secret ballots cast in US presidential elections; the objection may succeed 
in a small subset of elections, like small open caucuses in the Iowa primaries.
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Presented schematically, the second argument is as follows:
P1*. Different types of norms seem relevant to the ethics of voting.
P2*. Plurality rule seems to generate conflicts between these norms.
P3*. If plurality rule seems to generate conflicts between these norms, voters 
seem to face dilemmas under plurality rule.
C1*. So, voters seem to face dilemmas under plurality rule.
P4*. If voters seem to face dilemmas under plurality rule, we should prefer 
alternatives to plurality rule like IRV.
C2. So, we should prefer alternatives to plurality rule like IRV.
Each of the first three premises is more ecumenical than their counterparts in 
the original argument. It may be that only (say) consequentialist norms are 
relevant to the ethics of voting. But for a great many voters, it at least seems that 
two types of norms are relevant to voting: conscientious voters are motivated by 
more than one type of consideration.58 It may be that these two norms always 
march in lockstep. But to many voters, these norms seem to conflict. It may be 
that voters can make rational trade-offs between the values that underpin 
consequentialist and expressive norms, or can cancel the endorsement that 
voting for Morris communicates—but many voters still take decisions like 
whether to vote for Bayard or Morris to be dilemmas. Plausibly, this is why we 
hear perennial fretting about whether one should vote for a lesser-evil candidate 
who might win, rather than a candidate with integrity and decent values who 
will definitely lose.
The crucial premise in this argument, then, will be P4*. If voters seem to face 
dilemmas under plurality rule, why should we prefer alternatives to plurality 
rule like IRV? The fairly direct defense of P4 will not help us here. It may be a 
plausible principle that, ceteris paribus, we should avoid forcing others to face 
actual dilemmas, but it is not obvious (to me, at least) that we should avoid 
forcing others to face merely apparent dilemmas. So why should we accept 
P4*? How can an expressive case against plurality rule proceed from such an 
ecumenical but thin foundation?
To answer this, let’s modify the case. Imagine that (a) Eric’s positions were 
more extreme and odious by the lights of moderate racists, and (b) the proportion 
of black students (and Bayard supporters) was 10 per cent greater:
58See Brennan and Lomansky, Democracy and Decision, esp. ch. 2 and pp. 32–7.
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Eric Morris Bayard
40 28 32
Now consider Morris’s supporters. Perhaps they know that most of Bayard’s 
supporters are entrenched; they will not vote for Morris. The only way to defeat 
Eric is to vote for Bayard. But they’re still racists; they do not want to identify with 
or endorse a black candidate. If there are expressive norms that militate against 
endorsing evil and consequentialist norms that militate against probabilifying 
bad electoral outcomes, both militate in favor of voting for Bayard in this case. 
So there is no actual dilemma here. But it still seems to Morris’s supporters that 
they face a voting dilemma.
Why does this apparent dilemma that is generated by plurality rule matter? 
There are several possible answers. Morris’s supporters will experience greater 
emotional turmoil in casting a ballot for Bayard than in putting Bayard as their 
second preference after Morris, which gives us welfarist reasons for opposing 
plurality rule; and plausibly, insofar as voters hate facing what they take to be 
ethically fraught choices, they are more likely to opt out of the system under 
plurality rule, driving down voter participation.59 I will not dwell on these points, 
as I want to focus on a ground for P4* that is more germane to an expressive 
ethics of voting.
Consider the plausible idea that, by casting a ballot for Bayard, these voters 
would miscommunicate that they identify with and endorse anti-racism. This 
could lead to sincere or disingenuous distortions in public discourse, wherein 
those students’ votes will be offered as evidence that they are not racist. This may 
not be a cost to those students. But it is a cost to the political system if it generates 
inaccurate and imprecise communication.
For anyone who followed the fallout from the 2016 US election, this point 
should resonate. That many white Trump voters had previously voted for Barack 
Obama was often offered as evidence that those voters were not racist.60 To some 
degree, that’s fair enough. Casting a ballot for x has the social meaning that one 
endorses and identifies with x, and Obama was black and ran on an anti-racist 
platform; so, by casting a ballot for Obama, these voters expressed or 
communicated that they were not racist. But what they expressed or communicated 
was, in many cases, false. Polling data show that, of the white voters who cast 
ballots for Obama, 20–25 per cent did so despite having unfavorable attitudes 
towards interracial dating,61 and 37 per cent did so despite having unfavorable 
59Interestingly, empirical evidence strongly supports the claim that alternatives like IRV increase 
voter turnout; see André Blais and Agnieszka Dorbrzynska, “Turnout in electoral democracies,” 
European Journal of Political Research, 33 (1998), 239–61.
60For example, see Michael Moore’s interview as recounted in “Moore: Trump voters aren’t 
racists, many voted for Barack Hussein Obama,” Fox News (Nov. 11, 2016). For further examples, 
see Michael Tesler, “Obama won lots of votes from racially prejudiced whites (and some of them 
supported Trump),” Washington Post (Dec. 7, 2016).
61See Jamelle Bouie, “Why Obama voters defected,” Slate (June 20, 2017).
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attitudes towards Muslims.62 Somewhere between a fifth and a third of the white 
voters who cast a ballot for Obama were racists, but communicated otherwise. 
This is not because they “lied.” It is because plurality rule only gave them crude, 
coarse-grained options for expressing their political preferences.
By contrast, consider what voters can communicate under IRV. If white voters 
cast a first preference for a candidate like Morris and a second preference for a 
candidate like Bayard, who ended up winning the race, at most they would express 
weak endorsement of Bayard. Plausibly, they still express approval of a racist 
candidate and platform, and disapproval of Bayard. That would be important in 
subsequent political discourse. It would make it far harder for pundits to argue 
that those voters’ subsequent behavior was not motivated by racial prejudice or 
animus. A similar point holds for Bayard’s supporters in the original version of 
the case. If some of these voters cast a ballot for Morris under plurality rule, that 
could be treated as evidence that they endorse moderately racist policies: that 
black students really want, say, separate water fountains.
As this comparison between Bayard’s and Morris’s voters illustrates, plurality 
rule is problematic when it generates actual or apparent voting dilemmas. In both 
cases, plurality rule generates problematic forms of political miscommunication 
about who or what voters endorse. IRV prevents or at least ameliorates this 
problem by giving voters more expressive power. Consider Bayard’s supporters 
under IRV. If they voted for Bayard first and Morris second, it is at very least 
much harder to treat their votes as evidence that they endorse moderately racist 
policies. In this way, voting systems like IRV can provide more precise, accurate 
political communication in contexts where that is sorely needed. This gives us 
a basis to accept P4*, and to advocate for systems like IRV: in Brennan and 
Lomasky’s words, IRV “provide[s] adequate opportunity for individuals to 
express all the significant preferences they hold.”
Admittedly, if one is partial to the view that votes do not have social meanings, 
one may assign the blame for such miscommunication to the pundits rather 
than to plurality rule. But even then, we must ask: what can we realistically 
change? I know of no path by which we can change whether casting a ballot 
for x is interpreted as endorsing x, especially since politicians and pundits will 
have strong incentives to (mis)interpret votes as endorsements whenever it suits 
their purposes. Changing the voting system remains the best way to prevent such 
political miscommunication.
IV. CONCLUSION
So far, I have offered two simple, fairly ecumenical arguments against plurality 
rule. The first turns on actual voting dilemmas, the second on apparent voting 
dilemmas. The two are compatible and complimentary. And either gives us 
62See Tesler, “Obama won lots of votes from racially prejudiced whites.”
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strong reasons to prefer alternatives like IRV. This is not because IRV eliminates 
actual or apparent voting dilemmas; alternatives to plurality rule just need to 
ameliorate these concerns.
Of course, a strong pro tanto reason can still be outweighed, so plurality 
rule may still be defensible. But a strong pro tanto reason still has an important 
implication for how plurality rule can be adequately defended. It is often assumed 
in public debates that proponents of electoral reform bear the burden of showing 
why some alternative to plurality rule would be better; supporters of the status 
quo in the US and Uk just need to play defense. If the expressive case succeeds, 
the burden of proof is flipped and supporters of the status quo have far more 
work to do.
More generally, I hope to have shown something important about how we can 
evaluate voting systems. When we evaluate voting decisions, many think that we 
should care about more than their consequences with respect to candidates. One 
central upshot here is that the same holds when we evaluate voting systems. We 
should care about the expressive power they give voters, and how this affects 
voters’ fraught decisions (that is, actual or apparent voting dilemmas). Shifting 
our focus in this manner provides a powerful impetus for reforming current 
voting systems.
To keep things simple, I have illustrated this impetus for reform throughout by 
comparing plurality rule to IRV. But in closing, let me make three points about 
alternatives to plurality rule, in order to illustrate some of the complications 
that arise when we evaluate voting systems for how well they increase voters’ 
expressive power and avoid voting dilemmas.
The first point concerns the comparison between preferential and non-
preferential alternatives to plurality rule. Under plurality rule, each voter casts 
one vote for one option, and the option with the most votes wins. Preferential 
systems like IRV depart from this by having voters rank candidates. But non-
preferential alternatives to plurality rule can also help avoid dilemmas and 
increase the accuracy of what votes communicate.
Consider a simple departure from plurality rule: “negative voting.” This 
involves allowing voters to vote for or against options, such that one negative 
vote cancels out one positive vote.63 To illustrate this proposal, and see how it 
increases voters’ expressive power, recall our toy example. Bayard supporters 
know that 45 students will vote for Eric and 33 will vote for Morris. There are 
not enough students left for Bayard to win. But Bayard voters can prevent Eric 
from winning by voting against Eric, thereby reducing his lead. Morris could then 
win with the highest combined total, without a single Bayard supporter voting 
for Morris:
63I am grateful to Geoffrey Brennan for suggesting this. The method is described by Pacuit in 
“Voting methods,” but I know of no electoral system that implements it.
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Eric Morris Bayard
+45 for +33 for +7 for
-15 against -0 against -0 against
Total: 30 Total: 33 Total: 7
This is a promising proposal. It allows Bayard supporters to express their 
opposition to racism, while decreasing the odds that the worst candidate will 
win, and thereby avoids generating an actual dilemma. The proposal works just 
as well for Morris supporters in the second version of the case, too. It works 
because it lets voters express approval or disapproval.
This makes negative voting preferable to forms of plurality rule that are 
implemented across the globe. It also illustrates an important difference between 
negative voting and “approval voting” (which allows voters to vote for all of the 
options they approve of).64 Some hold that “[w]hen there are exactly three 
candidates, approval and negative are equivalent” (a vote against Eric is equivalent 
to a vote for Morris and Bayard), but “approval voting is more flexible” and 
“better” when there are more than three candidates.65 The latter point may be 
right (if there was an Eric “clone” in the election, negative voting does not allow 
you to vote against both extreme racists). But the former point isn’t obvious. 
There is a morally significant difference between negative and approval voting 
insofar as voting for and expressing approval of both Morris and Bayard isn’t 
equivalent to voting against and expressing disapproval of Eric.66
However, systems like IRV may still have an important advantage over systems 
like negative voting (and approval voting), insofar as they increase the precision 
of what votes communicate. Systems like IRV make the difference between the 
support for candidates like Ricky Muir and Mary Robinson clear as day: this 
affects, inter alia, the degree to which they have clear mandates.67 But systems 
like negative voting threaten to result in uncertainty about the degree of support 
for the victor: if Ricky Muir or Gary Johnson limped across the line on the back 
of the votes cast against their opponents, to what degree would they have a 
mandate? The answer can be unclear, and open to sincere or spurious 
64See Weber, “Approval voting”; and Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn, “Approval voting,” 
American Political Science Review, 72 (1978), 831–47. For detractors, see Donald Saari and Jill van 
Newenhizen, “The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems,” 
Public Choice, 59 (1988), 101–20.
65Poundstone, Gaming the Vote, p. 193; see also references therein.
66Admittedly, there are interesting questions about what these votes express. Aragones et al. 
“assume that the statement made by a voter in an approval voting system is the average of the state-
ments made by each of the party she approves of; Enriqueta Aragones, Itzhak Gilboa, and Andrew 
Weiss, “Making statements and approval voting,” Theory and Decision, 71 (2011), 461–72, at 
p. 463). Plausibly, it is more odious to express approval of the “average” of Morris’s moderate racism 
and Bayard’s anti-racism than it is to express disapproval of extreme racism. That’s all I need.
67The literature on mandates is contentious. For an interesting appeal to mandates, see Alex 
Guerrero, “The paradox of voting and the ethics of political representation,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 38 (2010), 272–306, and references therein.
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misinterpretation. In this sense, the precision of votes in IRV matters. If two 
voting systems both increase the accuracy of what votes communicate, but one 
improves the precision of what votes communicate, it should be preferred.68
The second point concerns the comparison between different preferential 
voting systems. One relevant consideration is which system gives voters the most 
expressive power. Above, I argued that the available orderings increase expressive 
power. Some may think that the available weightings matter too: a first and nth 
preference for Muir that are weighted equally (both count as 1) leave opaque the 
distance between Muir and the next candidate. If this is right, we have some 
reason to prefer a system that gives different weights to first and nth votes. 
Systems that give different weights to first and nth votes include “Borda count” 
(wherein voters rank candidates in order of preference, and each candidate gets a 
number of points corresponding to the number of candidates ranked lower; the 
candidate with the most points wins) and “cumulative voting” (wherein voters 
can distribute a fixed number of points among the candidates in any way they 
please; the candidate with the most points wins).69 These different weightings of 
first and nth preferences allow for more fine-grained communication about the 
distance between candidates.
This suggests that different forms of preferential voting may do better or worse 
in terms of how much they increase the precision of what votes communicate. But 
there may be trade-offs here. Because first and nth votes have the same weight 
under IRV, those who vote for Bayard first and Morris second do just as much 
to defeat Eric as those who vote for Morris first. By contrast, under Borda count 
or cumulative voting, causal or consequentialist norms may militate in favor of 
giving most points to Morris. This may in turn decrease the accuracy of what 
votes communicate, because it does not ameliorate actual or apparent dilemmas 
as successfully as IRV.
The third and final point concerns an impetus for reforming all voting systems. 
To increase voters’ expressive power, arguably we should provide voters with a 
formal option for expressing opposition to all candidates. Currently such 
opposition can be, at best, inferred from votes that are cast informally or for 
write-in protest candidates like Donald Duck.70 The Burdick decision held that 
such write-in votes need not be counted. Many have objected to this decision, 
68This leaves open an important question. What if we have to make trade-offs between accuracy 
and precision? This is arguably the case when we compare preferential voting systems like IRV to 
“lottery voting,” in which “all individuals cast votes for their preferred options but, instead of these 
being counted, one is randomly selected and that vote determines the outcome”; Ben Saunders, 
“Democracy, political equality, and majority rule,” Ethics, 121 (2010), 148–77, at p. 148. Since lot-
tery voting is strategy-proof (unlike IRV), but does not involve ranking candidates, it may allow for 
greater accuracy at the expense of greater precision (e.g., lottery voting would not convey whether 
Robinson had a greater mandate than Lenihan). I thank an anonymous referee for pushing me on this 
interesting point, which warrants far more discussion than I can give it here.
69For a more thorough explanation of these options, see Pacuit, “Voting methods.”
70Donald Duck has “a long and distinguished history as the exasperated voter’s candidate of 
choice”; Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. karlan, and Richard Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal 
Structure of the Political Process (St Paul: Foundation Press, 2011), p. 260.
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arguing that “ballot constraints of this kind … deprive the political system of 
information that can reveal legitimate discontent among minorities.”71 But if we 
want to provide that information accurately and precisely, we should allow voters 
to express it directly, rather than lumping it together with (a) votes cast informally 
out of confusion or (b) votes cast for Donald Duck for a lark. Insofar as some cast 
valid votes for “outsider” candidates as a way to express their rage against the 
machine, wouldn’t it be better to have a box for such voters to tick to express that 
rage formally and unambiguously?
These final points are only intended to illustrate the complexity of evaluating 
voting systems in terms of how well they increase voters’ expressive power and 
avoid voting dilemmas. It is high time we expanded our focus from concerns 
about which candidates win to concerns about what voters can and should 
express under different voting systems. Doing so provides a powerful impetus for 
practical reforms, and raises important but neglected theoretical questions about 
voting systems.
71Thompson, Just Elections, p. 25.
